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Same Name, Same Crime: Why Zelenskyy's UPA Decree Has EVERYTHING to Do With Volhynia

PUBLISHED DATEJuly 4, 2026
AUTHORRafał Majewski
CATEGORYBlog
STATUSPublished

"A detailed rebuttal of the EuroMaidan Press article reporting Prof. Norman Davies's claims that Zelenskyy's UPA decree 'has nothing to do with Volhynia' — a catalogue of errors, manipulations, and omitted facts."

The Euromaidan Press article by Maria Tril, published on 1 July 2026, is an example of tendentious journalism which, under the guise of reporting the views of an academic authority - Prof. Norman Davies - in fact engages in harmful political propaganda. The article consistently shifts the blame: it was not Zelenskyy who provoked the crisis by honouring an organisation responsible for genocide, but Poland that "made a mistake" by reacting to this fact. Below is a detailed catalogue of errors, manipulations and distortions.

1. "90 per cent of the UPA had nothing to do with Volhynia" - fact or manipulation with numbers?

Davies claims that "90 per cent of the UPA had nothing to do with Volhynia" and that Zelenskyy's decision to name a unit "Heroes of the UPA" therefore "has nothing to do with Volhynia". This is a manipulation on two levels.

First - Davies's argument rests on the false assumption that if the majority of UPA units operated geographically outside Volhynia, then honouring the UPA as an organisation has no connection to the Volhynia massacre. This is conflating geographic scope with organisational responsibility. The UPA was a single structure subordinated to the OUN-B, and the Volhynia massacre was an action by its structures — specifically UPA-North. A key role in the decision to extend the murders of Poles across all of Volhynia was played by Dmytro Klyachkivsky "Klym Savur", commander of UPA-North and one of the leaders of the Volhynian OUN-B. According to some historians, the decision to eliminate Poles may have been taken as early as the Third OUN-B Conference in February 1943; however, the IPN and some researchers point rather to a later decision by the Volhynian leadership of the OUN-B/UPA. Therefore, it is safer to speak of a decision at a high level of the OUN-B/UPA structures in Volhynia, rather than an indisputably proven formal decision of the entire top leadership of the OUN-B. This does not change the fact, however, that the massacre was an action of the UPA as an organisation — not of "loose groups" operating outside its structures.

Second - and this is the crucial fact that neither Davies nor the article mentions - the unit honoured by Zelenskyy is the Separate Centre of Special Operations "Pivnich". "Pivnich" means "North" in Ukrainian. This is exactly the same directional designation under which the UPA-"Pivnich" operated - the UPA command in Volhynia which, under Klyachkivsky's command, carried out the Volhynia massacre. Zelenskyy granted a military unit the title "Heroes of the UPA" and awarded it to a unit named "Pivnich" - the very same name under which the genocide was committed. Saying that this "has nothing to do with Volhynia" is simply untrue.

2. "The UPA was generally not a criminal organisation" - Prof. Szumiło responds

Davies stated in his interview with Onet: "One must say plainly that the UPA was generally not a criminal organisation. (...) But their goal was to fight the occupiers." On the very same day, 3 July 2026, Prof. Dariusz Szumiło published a direct rebuttal in Onet, calling Davies's claims "an unacceptable falsification of history".

The facts that refute Davies's thesis:

  • The UPA was established in October 1942 as the armed wing of the OUN-B - an organisation whose ideological foundation (the Decalogue of a Ukrainian Nationalist, 1929) explicitly commanded: "You shall not hesitate to commit the greatest crime when the good of the Cause demands it."
  • In June 1943, Klyachkivsky issued a directive for the "general physical liquidation" of the Polish population. Testimony was given by Yuriy Stelmashchuk after his capture by the NKVD. (Source: IPN, Wikipedia)
  • On 11 July 1943 (the so-called "Bloody Sunday"), the UPA carried out a coordinated attack on 99-150 Polish localities in a single day. This was not "fighting occupiers" - it was a planned extermination of civilians.
  • Death toll: approximately 40-60 thousand in Volhynia alone, approximately 100 thousand including Eastern Galicia (estimates by the IPN, Snyder and Motyka).
  • The OUN-B collaborated with the Abwehr from 1928 onwards. In June 1941, posters were put up in Lviv reading: "Moscow, Poland, Magyars, Jewry - your enemy. Destroy them!"

An organisation that planned and carried out the extermination of 100,000 civilians on the basis of an ideological manifesto explicitly inciting criminal acts is a criminal organisation. Regardless of whether it also fought the Soviets or the Germans in parallel.

3. The comparison of the UPA to the Cursed Soldiers - key differences

Davies compared the UPA to the Cursed Soldiers (Żołnierze Wyklęci): "It is comparable to the Cursed Soldiers in Poland." This comparison is false and Prof. Szumiło categorically rejected it. Here is why:

  • The Cursed Soldiers fought against the Soviet occupation of Poland. They did not carry out ethnic cleansing of any other nationality. No directive was ever issued for the "physical liquidation" of an entire nation or ethnic group.
  • The UPA fought against occupiers, but in parallel carried out a planned extermination of the Polish civilian population - including women, children and the elderly. This was not a side-effect of combat but a political objective.
  • The Cursed Soldiers had no ideological manifesto explicitly commanding the "commission of the greatest crime". The OUN's Decalogue of 1929 was precisely such a manifesto.
  • Individual crimes committed by certain Cursed Soldiers' units (e.g. against Belarusians or Ukrainians) were isolated incidents, not an organised extermination campaign approved by the highest political leadership.
  • Poland has never named a military unit after soldiers accused of crimes against civilians of another nationality. Ukraine has named a unit after an organisation that committed genocide.

4. The number of Ukrainian victims - Davies inflates and distorts the proportions

Davies stated that "Poles, the AK, counter-attacked Ukrainians in Volhynia" and that "in retaliatory operations, the AK killed between 10,000 and 15,000 Ukrainians in Volhynia". The article repeats this uncritically.

The facts from the table of estimates on Wikipedia (based on the work of Motyka, Snyder, Rudling and others):

  • Grzegorz Motyka (the most authoritative Polish historian on this subject): 2-3 thousand Ukrainians killed in Volhynia, 10-20 thousand across all regions (1943-1947). Motyka explicitly states that figures of 30 thousand and above are "simply pulled out of thin air".
  • Timothy Snyder: approximately 10 thousand Ukrainian civilians killed by Polish self-defence, Soviet partisans and German police combined (not solely by the AK!).
  • Per Anders Rudling: approximately 20 thousand Ukrainians killed by Polish forces in total.

Even taking the highest estimates (20 thousand Ukrainians killed by Poles), the ratio is 100 thousand Polish victims versus 20 thousand Ukrainian - that is, 5:1. Davies gives 10-15 thousand for Volhynia alone, which inflates Motyka's estimates (2-3 thousand) fivefold, and then uses this inflated figure to create a false symmetry.

Moreover, the crucial difference that Davies fails to note: Polish retaliatory operations were reactive. There exists no Polish document equivalent to the Klyachkivsky directive. There was no Polish order for the "general physical liquidation" of the Ukrainian population. The retaliatory operations of the AK and the BCh (Peasant Battalions) were a response to the ongoing extermination of the Polish population, not a planned extermination campaign.

5. "Zelenskyy had never heard of the UPA" - speculation, not fact

Davies repeatedly asserts: "I am convinced that Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who comes from eastern Ukraine, had never heard of the UPA at all" and "he has absolutely no familiarity with the UPA". The Onet journalist corrected him on multiple occasions: "President Andrzej Duda and other Polish politicians explained this to him, he was briefed on the matter" and "President Zelenskyy visited Volhynia, met with President Duda, and they discussed Volhynia during the war."

Davies himself admitted: "I do not know Zelenskyy. I have never spoken with him." Despite this, he speculates about Zelenskyy's knowledge and motivations. This is the domain of punditry, not history. The Euromaidan Press article repeats this speculation as fact.

6. "This affair will cost Poland in the future" - a threat, not an argument

Davies warns: "This affair will cost Poland in the future. There will be consequences of the fact that at such a moment (...) the Polish president gave Russia a very favourable pretext." The article presents this as sage geopolitical advice.

This is not a historical argument - it is a threat. The implication is as follows: if Poland demands the truth about the genocide and refuses to accept the glorification of criminals, Ukraine will "remember" this and "punish" Poland in the future. This is emotional blackmail, not scholarly debate.

Moreover, it reverses the responsibility: it was Zelenskyy who decided to honour the UPA. It was not Poland that "chose this moment to start talking about unpleasant matters" - it was Ukraine that chose this moment to honour an organisation responsible for the genocide of Poles. Poland reacted. The reaction of a victim to the glorification of their tormentor is not a "provocation" - it is a minimum of respect for the murdered.

7. The "timing" argument - silence about genocide in the name of war?

Davies proposes: "Poles at this point should say: fine, the matter is unresolved, but we shall wait until the end of this war." The article presents this as a reasonable strategy.

This is a morally unacceptable argument. It implies that Poland should remain silent about the glorification of an organisation that murdered 100,000 Polish civilians because Ukraine is fighting a war with Russia. But it is Ukraine that is the party which:

Poland has taken in 2 million Ukrainian refugees, provided military and humanitarian aid since 2022, and is one of Ukraine's most important allies. In return, it asks for one thing: that the organisation which murdered Polish families not be honoured. This is not "choosing a bad moment" - it is a minimum of respect.

8. Davies compares Volhynia to Gaza - deeply problematic

In the interview, Davies said: "Look at what is happening in Gaza. On 7 October 2023, a terrible massacre was carried out by Hamas in Israel. 1,500 people were murdered. In retaliation, Israel killed 90,000 Palestinians (...) One cannot look at this from only one side."

This comparison is a falsification on several levels:

  • Hamas is a terrorist organisation, recognised as such by most Western states. The UPA is glorified by the Ukrainian state at the presidential level.
  • Israel conducts military operations in response to a terrorist attack. What the UPA did was not a response to a Polish attack - it was a planned extermination of civilians on the basis of a political directive.
  • Casualty figures: in Volhynia, approximately 100,000 Poles (civilians, including women and children) were killed by the UPA. Ukrainian victims of Polish retaliatory operations number 2-3 thousand in Volhynia (Motyka) to a maximum of 20 thousand across all regions. The ratio is 5:1 to 50:1, unlike the situation in Gaza.
  • Davies uses this comparison to equate planned genocide (the Volhynia massacre) with military retaliation (the AK's counter-operations), which is a false equivalence.

9. The article omits crucial facts

The Euromaidan Press article, under the guise of reporting Davies's interview, omits all facts that undermine the narrative of "Poland is wrong, Ukraine is right":

  • It does not mention the 7-year ban on exhumations imposed by Ukraine (2017-2024). Hundreds of mass graves of Polish victims remained inaccessible.
  • It does not mention the Klyachkivsky directive and the Stelmashchuk testimony - documents from Soviet archives that confirm the planned nature of the extermination.
  • It does not mention the OUN's Decalogue of 1929 - a manifesto explicitly calling for the "greatest crime".
  • It does not mention the 2016 resolution of the Polish Sejm recognising the Volhynia massacre as genocide (432 votes for, 0 against, 60 abstentions).
  • It does not mention that "Pivnich" (the name of the unit honoured by Zelenskyy) is the same directional designation under which the UPA operated in Volhynia.
  • It does not mention the collaboration of the OUN-B with Nazi Germany (Abwehr, training from 1928 onwards) nor the involvement of the OUN in the Holocaust.
  • It does not mention that Klyachkivsky - the chief organiser of the massacre - has monuments in Ukraine, and that the Verkhovna Rada in 2020 passed a resolution for his commemoration at the state level.

10. The "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" argument - why a commission when the facts are known?

Davies proposes a Truth and Reconciliation Commission modelled on post-apartheid South Africa. The article presents this as a wise middle course.

The problem is that the facts are already established. The IPN has published its findings. The Klyachkivsky directive is documented. The Stelmashchuk testimony is in the Soviet archives. The death toll has been estimated by serious historians (Snyder, Motyka, Hryciuk and the IPN). The Polish Sejm has passed a resolution recognising genocide.

A commission is needed where facts are disputed. Here, it is not the facts that are disputed - it is whether Ukraine wishes to acknowledge them. Ukraine consistently refuses to recognise the Volhynia massacre as genocide. This is not a problem of "unexplored history" - it is a problem of "a refusal to acknowledge the truth".

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa worked because both sides wanted reconciliation. Here, one side (Ukraine) glorifies the perpetrators, blocks exhumations and refuses to recognise the genocide. A commission without a prior change in this attitude would be a façade, not reconciliation.

11. Ukrainian memory "long", Polish memory "negligent"?

Davies says: "Ukrainians will have terrible grievances against Poles that during the war they started talking about unpleasant matters" and "Ukrainian memory is long". The article repeats this uncritically.

This is an asymmetrical approach. Ukrainian memory is to be "long" and Ukraine is to have the right to "remember" Poland's demand for truth about Volhynia. But Polish memory of 100,000 murdered compatriots - that is to be "postponed"? Ukraine has the right to resent Poland for asking that its tormentors not be honoured, but Poland has no right to resent Ukraine for honouring those tormentors?

This is a double standard. Every nation has the right to remember its victims. Polish memory of Volhynia is not a "political game" or "choosing a bad moment" - it is a duty towards the murdered.

Summary and Reflection: Davies's Errors and the Polish-Ukrainian Trap

The Euromaidan Press article is an example of manipulation in which the statement of one historian - however distinguished - is presented as the final verdict on the matter, whilst the facts say otherwise. Prof. Norman Davies is undoubtedly a distinguished historian of Poland, but in this matter he committed a series of factual errors:

  • He equated the UPA with the Cursed Soldiers, ignoring the fact that the UPA carried out a planned extermination of 100,000 civilians on the basis of an ideological manifesto explicitly inciting criminal acts.
  • He inflated the number of Ukrainian victims of Polish retaliatory operations in Volhynia (10-15 thousand versus Motyka's estimates of 2-3 thousand).
  • He speculated about Zelenskyy's ignorance, whilst admitting that he himself does not know him and has never spoken with him.
  • He threatened Poland with "consequences" for demanding the truth about the genocide.
  • He compared the Volhynia massacre to the war in Gaza, creating a false equivalence between planned genocide and military retaliation.

The article, meanwhile, omits all the inconvenient facts: the 7-year ban on exhumations, the Klyachkivsky directive, the OUN's Decalogue, the 2016 Sejm resolution, the collaboration of the OUN-B with Nazi Germany, Prof. Szumiło's rebuttal and - most strikingly - the fact that the unit honoured by Zelenskyy bears the name "Pivnich" (North), the very same designation under which the UPA carried out the massacre in Volhynia.

Poland did not "make a mistake" by reacting to the glorification of an organisation responsible for genocide. The mistake was the honouring of this organisation by the president of a country that is seeking an alliance with Poland and EU membership. And the mistake is the relativisation of this fact by media outlets which, under the guise of reporting an "authority", engage in one-sided propaganda.

Which is more dangerous - Russian or Ukrainian imperialism?

In this whole dispute, one must be able to answer a fundamental question: which is more dangerous - Russian imperialism or Ukrainian imperialism? The answer is clear. Russia has been building its empire since the sixteenth century - from Kazan to Crimea, from Siberia to Sakhalin, from Ivan the Terrible to Putin. Ukraine has never been an empire. There is no Ukrainian tradition of conquering neighbours, no Ukrainian armies marching on Moscow or Warsaw for centuries. The only "imperialism" Ukraine ever experienced was Russian imperialism - as its victim, not its perpetrator.

But this answer confronts us with another difficult question: how do we deal with the way the Ukrainian authorities treat Poland, given that we know Russian imperialism is the greater threat? For this is the whole complexity of the situation - and this is precisely what Russia plays on. Russia knows that Poland cannot cut itself off from Ukraine, because it is Poland, not Ukraine, that is within direct reach of Russian imperialism. And this is why Russia fuels this dispute with such relish - because it knows Poland is trapped: stay silent, and it betrays the memory of its victims, when react, and it gives Russia a pretext to stoke tensions.

But being trapped does not mean we should remain silent. It means we must be able to do two things at once: pursue the truth about Volhynia and refuse to be drawn into anti-Ukrainian rhetoric that serves Russia's interests. The problem is that it is Ukraine - not Poland - that makes this task harder, by honouring the UPA and blocking exhumations. Poland did not create this trap. Ukraine pushed Poland into it, and Russia rubs its hands.

Pursuing the truth about Volhynia and standing in solidarity with Ukraine against Russia are not contradictory stances - they are the same principle: crimes must be called by their name, and imperialism - whether Russian or any other - must be resisted. But to carry this out, Ukraine must stop handing Russia ammunition. Because every honouring of the UPA, every blocked exhumation, every monument to Klyachkivsky is a gift to Russian propaganda - and a blow to the Polish-Ukrainian alliance, which is the only real obstacle to Russian imperialism in Central Europe.

SOURCES:

  1. Prof. Norman Davies's interview with Onet (29 June 2026): https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/prof-norman-davies-o-kulcie-upa-ta-afera-bedzie-kosztowac-polske-w-przyszlosci/f99qm8y
  2. Prof. Szumiło's rebuttal: "Norman Davies is wrong: the UPA was a criminal organisation" (3 July 2026): https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/opinie/prof-szumilo-norman-davies-nie-ma-racji-upa-byla-organizacja-przestepcza/6809q9l
  3. Decree 440/2026 - granting the "Pivnich" unit the title "Heroes of the UPA": https://kyivindependent.com/zelenskys-decision-to-name-military-unit-after-wwii-era-ukrainian-insurgent-army-sparks-outrage-in-poland/
  4. UPA-"Pivnich" (UPA-North) - Klyachkivsky's command in Volhynia: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmytro_Klaczkiwski
  5. The Klyachkivsky directive (June 1943) and Stelmashchuk's testimony: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmytro_Klaczkiwski
  6. IPN - July 1943 in Volhynia: https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/55837,Lipiec-1943-roku-na-Wolyniu.html
  7. Decalogue of a Ukrainian Nationalist (1929, Stepan Lenkavsky): https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dekalog_ukrai%C5%84skiego_nacjonalisty
  8. Estimates of victims of the Volhynia massacre (Poles killed by Ukrainians): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estimates_of_victims_of_the_Volhynia_and_Eastern_Galicia_massacres
  9. Estimates of Ukrainian victims (Ukrainians killed by Poles) - Motyka: 2-3 thousand in Volhynia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estimates_of_victims_of_the_Volhynia_and_Eastern_Galicia_massacres
  10. Polish Sejm resolution recognising the Volhynia massacre as genocide (2016): https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rze%C5%BA_wo%C5%82y%C5%84ska
  11. Ban on exhumations in Ukraine (2017-2024), lifted in November 2024: https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/02/20/ukraine-permits-further-searches-for-polish-wwii-massacre-victims/
  12. OUN-B collaboration with Germany (Abwehr, training from 1928): https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organizacja_Ukrai%C5%84skich_Nacjonalist%C3%B3w
  13. OUN-B proclamation in Lviv (1941): https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pogromy_lwowskie_(1941)
  14. Klyachkivsky - monuments and commemoration in Ukraine: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmytro_Klaczkiwski
  15. Cursed Soldiers - absence of an ethnic cleansing directive: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cursed_soldiers
  16. Norman Davies compares the UPA to the Cursed Soldiers (RP.pl): https://www.rp.pl/dyplomacja/art44721811-prof-norman-davies-porownal-upa-do-zolnierzy-wykletych
  17. Euromaidan Press - article by Maria Tril (1 July 2026): https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/01/zelenskyys-upa-decree-had-nothing-to-do-with-volhynia-says-historian-davies-and-poland-will-pay-for-raising-it-now/